Voting games with endogenously infeasible coalitions
AbstractWhile they use the language of game theory the known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave di erently from the indices' predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is de ned over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is defined over the game with the remaining winning coalitions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Working Paper Series with number 1001.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-06-04 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
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