Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information, Second Version
AbstractThis paper studies the inference of interaction effects, i.e., the impacts of players' actions on each other's payoffs, in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects that does not require parametric specifications of players' payoffs, the distributions of their private signals or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure is valid in the presence of multiple equilibria, and, as a by-product of our approach, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the data-generating process. We provide Monte Carlo evidence of the test's good performance infinite samples. We also implement the test to infer the direction of interaction effects in couples' joint retirement decisions using data from the Health and Retirement Study.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 10-021.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 08 Apr 2010
Date of revision: 30 Jun 2010
identification; inference; multiple equilibria; incomplete information games;
Other versions of this item:
- Aureo de Paula & Xun Tang, 2010. "Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 12 Feb 2011.
- C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-07-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ECM-2010-07-10 (Econometrics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2010. "Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 409-431, August.
- Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, 2013.
"Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions,"
Journal of Human Resources,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 474-508.
- Marco Francesconi & Mich�le Belot, 2011. "Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions," Economics Discussion Papers 702, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Nianqing Liu & Haiqing Xu, . "Semiparametric Analysis of Binary Games of Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 130911, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2012.
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