Correlated Equilibria in Some Classes of Two-Person Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 45.
Date of creation: Jun 1973
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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- Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 641, Stockholm School of Economics.
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