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R&D Competition with Asymmetric Firms

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  • J. Poyago-Theotoky,

Abstract

This paper considers a nontournament duopoly model of process innovation. Costs of production can be reduced by firms spending on R&D. Firms are asymmetric in the sense that they may differ in their initial costs of production . It is shown that the high-cost firm may spend more (or less) in R&D than its low-cost rival. This main result is dependent on the relative magnitude of two important forces: the incentive effect, whereby the low-cost firm always has a stronger incentive to spend on cost-reducing R&D, and the effectiveness factor, which favors the high-cost firm. Copyright 1996 by Scottish Economic Society.

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Paper provided by University of Nottingham, School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 96/13.

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Handle: RePEc:not:notecp:96/13

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Postal: School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD
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Cited by:
  1. Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 179-209.
  2. Andrew McKay & Oliver Morrissey & Charlotte Vaillant, . "Aggregate Export and Food Crop Supply Response in Tanzania," Discussion Papers 98/4, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
  3. Escrihuela-Villar, Marc, 2004. "Innovation and market concentration with asymmetric firms," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/03, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  4. Pedro P. Barros & Tore Nilssen, 1999. "The Effect of Firm Heterogeneity on R&D Competition," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 25, pages 87-93.
  5. SUETENS, Sigrid, 2004. "Literature review: R&D cooperation in oligopoly with spillovers: An experimental economics approach," Working Papers 2004024, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  6. Barros, Pedro P & Nilssen, Tore, 1999. " Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 597-616, December.
  7. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak, 2009. "R&D Productivity and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Regimes," Working Paper Series, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis 43_09, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Jan 2009.
  8. Banerjee, Dyuti & Chatterjee, Ishita, 2010. "The impact of piracy on innovation in the presence of technological and market uncertainty," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 391-397, December.

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