The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
AbstractThis paper argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured -- which can be done by making it necessary for hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support -- boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The paper considers all of the arguments that have been offered for board veto -- including ones based on analogies to other corporate decisions, directors' superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short-run, inferences from IPO charters, interests of long-term shareholders, aggregate shareholder wealth, and protection of stakeholders. Examining these arguments both at the level of theory and in light of all available empirical evidence, the paper concludes that none of them individually, nor all of them taken together, warrants a board veto. Finally, the paper discusses the implications that the analysis has for judicial review of defensive tactics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9078.
Date of creation: Jul 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2002. "The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 3445, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-07-31 (All new papers)
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- Robert Campbell & Chinmoy Ghosh & Milena Petrova & C. Sirmans, 2011. "Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 451-480, May.
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