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Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs

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  • Robert Campbell
  • Chinmoy Ghosh
  • Milena Petrova
  • C. Sirmans

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  • Robert Campbell & Chinmoy Ghosh & Milena Petrova & C. Sirmans, 2011. "Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 451-480, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:42:y:2011:i:4:p:451-480
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-009-9202-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamie Alcock & John Glascock & Eva Steiner, 2013. "Manipulation in U.S. REIT Investment Performance Evaluation: Empirical Evidence," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 434-465, October.
    2. Jarl G. Kallberg & Yoshiki Shimizu, 2023. "Acquisitions and the Opportunity Set," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 904-938, May.
    3. Steffen Westermann & Scott J. Niblock & Michael A. Kortt, 2018. "A Review of Corporate Social Responsibility and Real Estate Investment Trust Studies: An Australian Perspective," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 37(1), pages 92-110, March.
    4. Chris Ratcliffe & Bill Dimovski & Monica Keneley, 2017. "The Performance of REIT Acquirers in the Post-Merger Period," ERES eres2017_43, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    5. Vishaal Baulkaran & Pawan Jain, 2023. "CDS contract initiations: REIT board monitoring and corporate decision outcomes," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 217-246, February.
    6. Ghosh, Chinmoy & Petrova, Milena & Xiao, Yihong, 2012. "Do REITs use cash reserves efficiently? Evidence from corporate acquisitions," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 1953-1970.
    7. Chiuling Lu & Tzujui Mao & Yang-pin Shen, 2015. "Beyond friendly acquisitions: the case of REITs," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 139-159, January.
    8. J. Mulherin & Kiplan Womack, 2015. "Competition, Auctions & Negotiations in REIT Takeovers," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 151-180, February.
    9. Daoju Peng & Jianfu Shen & Simon Yu Kit Fung & Eddie C. M. Hui & Kwokyuen Fan, 2024. "The Valuation Effect and Consequences of Clawback Adoption in Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 274-317, February.
    10. Steffen Westermann & Scott Niblock & Michael Kortt, 2018. "Corporate social responsibility and the performance of Australian REITs: a rolling regression approach," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(4), pages 222-234, July.
    11. Jian Liang & Ameeta Jain & Hao Wu, 2021. "Does Corporate Social Responsibility Vary by Real Estate Asset Types? Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(22), pages 1-18, November.
    12. Isil Erol & Umut Unal & Yener Coskun, 2021. "ESG Investing and the Financial Performance: A Panel Data Analysis of Developed REIT Markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202123, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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