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Social Security and Retirement in Japan

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  • Takashi Oshio
  • Naohiro Yashiro
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    Abstract

    We provide the incentive mechanism of the public pension on the retirement decisions made in the Japanese labor market. Though the labor market participation of Japanese older persons is quite high by international standards, a principle incentive mechanism of the public pension system in Japan affecting the retirement behavior has many things in common with those in other OECD countries. The pension benefits are designed actuarially unfair,' and the decision to work beyond age 60 is penalized. As the population ages quite rapidly, it is wasteful to maintain the disincentive mechanism arising from the actuarially unfair pension scheme for older persons.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6156.

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    Date of creation: Sep 1997
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    Publication status: published as Social Security and Retirement in Japan , Naohiro Yashiro, Takashi Oshio . in Social Security and Retirement around the World , Gruber and Wise. 1999
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6156

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    Cited by:
    1. Borsch-Supan, Axel, 2000. "Incentive effects of social security on labor force participation: evidence in Germany and across Europe," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 25-49, October.
    2. Weller, Christian E., 2001. "Programs without alternative: Public pensions in the OECD," ZEI Working Papers B 15-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
    3. Kaiji Chen & Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu, 2007. "The Japanese saving rate between 1960 and 2000: productivity, policy changes, and demographics," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, July.
    4. Manow, Philip, 2001. "Globalization, corporate finance, and coordinated capitalism: Pension finance in Germany and Japan," MPIfG Working Paper 01/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Tongwook Park, 2000. "Optimal Social Security with Moral Hazard," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1265, Econometric Society.
    6. Selo Imrohoroglu & Kaiji Chen & Ayse Imrohoroglu, 2005. "Japanese Saving Rate," 2005 Meeting Papers 747, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Axel Borsch-Supan, 1998. "Incentive Effects of Social Security on Labor Force Participation: Evidence in Germany and Across Europe," NBER Working Papers 6780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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