This paper argues that the financial exposure of households and firms to natural catastrophe disasters is borne primarily by insurance companies. Surprisingly, insurers use reinsurance to cover only a small fraction of these exposures, yet many insurers do not have enough capital and surplus to survive medium or large disasters. In a well-functioning financial system, these risks would be more widely shared. This paper articulates eight different explanations that may lie behind the limited risk sharing, relating them both to recent industry developments and financial theory. I then examine how financial innovation can help change the equilibrium toward a more efficient outcome.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
6025.
Length: Date of creation: Apr 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6025
Note: AP CF Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)