Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets
AbstractThis article attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multiperiod principal-agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control, and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss-sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring. In contrast, we find evidence for the extensive use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring costs are lower. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The American Risk and Insurance Association in its journal The Journal of Risk and Insurance.
Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- G0 - Financial Economics - - General
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