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Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Jeffrey R. Brown
  • Randall S. Kroszner
  • Brian H. Jenn

Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a loss for commercial property & casualty insurers that was both unprecedented and unanticipated. After sustaining this record capital loss, the availability of adequate private insurance coverage against future terrorist attacks came into question. Concern over the potential adverse consequences of the lack of availability of insurance against terrorist incidents led to calls for federal intervention in insurance markets. This paper discusses the economic rationale for and against federal intervention in the market, and concludes that the benefits from establishing a temporary transition program, during which the private sector can build capacity and adapt to a dramatically changed environment for terrorism risk, may provide benefits to the economy that exceed the direct and indirect costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey R. Brown & Randall S. Kroszner & Brian H. Jenn, 2002. "Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9271
    Note: PE
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1996. "Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
    3. Randall S. Kroszner, 1998. "On the political economy of banking and financial regulatory reform in emerging markets," Proceedings 605, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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    6. Paul Kleindorfer & Howard Kunreuther, 1999. "Challenges Facing the Insurance Industry in Managing Catastrophic Risks," NBER Chapters, in: The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, pages 149-194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Howard Kunreuther & Geoffrey Heal, 2002. "Interdependent Security: The Case of Identical Agents," NBER Working Papers 8871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi (ed.), 1998. "The Political Economy of Reform," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262194007, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich Schneider & Tilman Brück & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1049, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Barker, David, 2003. "Terrorism insurance subsidies and social welfare," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 328-338, September.
    3. Amegashie, J.A. & Kutsoati, E., 2003. "Optimal Terror Alerts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003-6, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    4. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Cummins, J. David & Lewis, Christopher M. & Wei, Ran, 2004. "An empirical analysis of the economic impact of federal terrorism reinsurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(5), pages 861-898, July.
    5. Andrés Solimano, 2003. "Prevention and Insurance of Conflict and Terrorism: Issues and Evidence for Latin America," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 617-625.
    6. Woodard, Joshua, 2016. "Estimation of Insurance Deductible Demand under Endogenous Premium Rates," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 236151, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    7. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," NBER Working Papers 18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Beverly Porter, 2003. "Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 10179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Lakdawalla, Darius & Zanjani, George, 2005. "Insurance, self-protection, and the economics of terrorism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1891-1905, September.
    10. Solimano, Andrés, 2004. "Political violence and economic development in Latin America: issues and evidence," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5395, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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