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Designing Benefits for Platform Workers

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  • Jonathan Gruber

Abstract

Designing benefits for the growing platform workforce in the U.S. poses significant challenges. While platform workers need protection against unforeseen shocks, work that is often part time and spread across multiple platforms makes the traditional benefits model untenable. This paper reports the results from a survey of drivers and couriers working with Uber to help understand their benefits preferences. We find that there is a wide diversity across these workers in platform earnings, the share of platform earnings from Uber, the share of family earnings from platform work and the availability of benefits from other jobs. We use willingness-to-pay questions to show that workers are willing to trade off additional income for benefits; after accounting for the tax advantage of benefits, workers are roughly indifferent on average between the two. While there are some trends in valuation, such as higher valuation for pension than for health contributions, the most notable feature of the data is the wide variation across workers in their preferences across benefits types and relative to income. Workers also show a preference for benefits that can help them commit to increase savings in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Gruber, 2022. "Designing Benefits for Platform Workers," NBER Working Papers 29736, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29736
    Note: AG EH IO PE
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    Cited by:

    1. Zoe Hitzig & Benjamin Niswonger, 2022. "Optimal Defaults, Limited Enforcement and the Regulation of Contracts," Papers 2203.01233, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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