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Corporate Governance and Blockchains

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  • David Yermack

Abstract

Blockchains represent a novel application of cryptography and information technology to ag-eold problems of financial record-keeping, and they may lead to far-reaching changes in corporate governance. Many major players in the financial industry have began to invest in this new technology, and stock exchanges have proposed using blockchains as a new method for trading corporate equities and tracking their ownership. This essay evaluates the potential implications of these changes for managers, institutional investors, small shareholders, auditors, and other parties involved in corporate governance. The lower cost, greater liquidity, more accurate record-keeping, and transparency of ownership offered by blockchains may significantly upend the balance of power among these cohorts.

Suggested Citation

  • David Yermack, 2015. "Corporate Governance and Blockchains," NBER Working Papers 21802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alex Edmans & Vivian W. Fang & Emanuel Zur, 2013. "The Effect of Liquidity on Governance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(6), pages 1443-1482.
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    3. Yermack, David, 2009. "Deductio' ad absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 107-123, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Auer, 2019. "Embedded supervision: how to build regulation into blockchain finance," BIS Working Papers 811, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Raphael A. Auer, 2022. "Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Decentralised Finance," CESifo Working Paper Series 9771, CESifo.
    3. Fernanda Momo & Giovana Schiavi & Ariel Behr & Percival Lucena, 2019. "Business Models and Blockchain: What Can Change?," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 23(2), pages 228-248.
    4. Philippon, Thomas, 2016. "The FinTech Opportunity," CEPR Discussion Papers 11409, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Pfaff, & Troßmann,, 2016. "Die Kosten- und Leistungsrechnung – Ein Blick auf mehr als 70 Jahre Vergangenheit und eine spannende Zukunft," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 70(4), pages 365-386.
    6. Byström, Hans, 2016. "Blockchains, Real-Time Accounting and the Future of Credit Risk Modeling," Working Papers 2016:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    7. Plinio Limata, 2020. "Blockchain and Institutions (II): The Realm of Law," CERBE Working Papers wpC36, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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