Why did the Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?
AbstractThree possible explanations for the emergence of the Canadian central bank in 1935 are examined: that it reflected the need of competitive banking systems for a lender of the last resort; that it was necessary to anchor the unregulated Canadian monetary system after the abandonment of the gold standard in 1929; and that it was a response to political rather than purely economic pressures. Evidence from a variety of sources (contemporary statements to a Royal Commission, the correspondence of chartered bankers, newspaper reports, academic writings and the estimation of time series econometric models) rejects the first two hypotheses and supports the third.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2079.
Date of creation: Nov 1986
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Publication status: published as Bordo, Michael D. and Angela Redish. "Why did the Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?" Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVII, No. 2, June 1987, pp. 405-4 17.
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- Bordo, Michael D. & Redish, Angela, 1987. "Why Did the Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(02), pages 405-417, June.
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