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Managing Bank Liquidity Risk: How Deposit-Loan Synergies Vary with Market Conditions

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  • Evan Gatev
  • Til Schuermann
  • Philip E. Strahan

Abstract

Liquidity risk in banking has been attributed to transactions deposits and their potential to spark runs or panics. We show instead that transactions deposits help banks hedge liquidity risk from unused loan commitments. Bank stock-return volatility increases with unused commitments, but the increase is smaller for banks with high levels of transactions deposits. This deposit-lending risk management synergy becomes more powerful during periods of tight liquidity, when nervous investors move funds into their banks. Our results reverse the standard notion of liquidity risk at banks, where runs from depositors had been seen as the cause of trouble.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12234.

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Date of creation: May 2006
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Publication status: published as Evan Gatev & Til Schuermann & Philip E. Strahan, 2009. "Managing Bank Liquidity Risk: How Deposit-Loan Synergies Vary with Market Conditions," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 995-1020, March.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12234

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