Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of Debt Finance
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 8827.
Length: 27P. pages
Date of creation: 1988
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- Brander, J.A. & Poitevin, M., 1988. "Managerial Compensation And The Agency Costs Of Debt Finance," Cahiers de recherche 8827, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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- Patrick Bolton & Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, 2010. "Executive compensation and risk taking," Staff Reports 456, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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