Unemployment and interactions between trade and labour market institutions
AbstractThere is ample evidence that a country's labour market institutions are important determinants of unemployment. This study generalises Davis' (1998) idea according to which the institutions of the trade partners matter also for a country's equilibrium unemployment rate as they generate comparative advantages. Moreover, the empirical investigation provides some evidence that the interactions between bilateral trade and relative labour market regulations affect the equilibrium unemployment rate. Given data limitations in this area, the ambition of this paper is merely to draw the attention to the general relevance of these interactions as complementing factors to other explanations of unemployment. Another interesting finding is that a fairly low regulated country like Canada can be negatively affected because its main trading partner is even less regulated, while a high regulated country like Germany appears rather sheltered because its trading partners are also highly regulated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number bla08016.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
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Unemployment; trade; labour market institutions.;
Other versions of this item:
- Hervé Boulhol, 2008. "Unemployment and interactions between trade and labour market institutions," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00261478, HAL.
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2008-04-15 (International Trade)
- NEP-LAB-2008-04-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-OPM-2008-04-15 (Open Economy Macroeconomic)
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- Sebastian Braun & Christian Spielmann, 2010.
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Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim
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