Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern
AbstractWe analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals ans society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical neutrality assumption to this setting and characterize the class of neutral social welfare function. This class turns out to be considerably broader for indeterminate than for determinate utilities, where it basically reduces to utilitarianism. In particular, aggregation rules may differ by the relationship between individual and social indeterminacy. We characterize several subclasses of neutral aggregation rules and show that utilitarian rules are those that yield the least indeterminate social utilities, although they still fail to systematically yield a determinate social utility.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 10068.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Aggregation; vNM utility; indeterminacy; neutrality; utilitarianism.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2010-10-30 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Evren, Özgür & Ok, Efe A., 2011. "On the multi-utility representation of preference relations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 554-563.
- Eric Danan & Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2012.
"Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences,"
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Eric Danan & Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2013. "Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences," THEMA Working Papers 2013-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Eric Danan & Thilbault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2012. "Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12082, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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