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Market Definition As a Social Construction (Marktabgrenzung als soziale Konstruktion)

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Author Info
Christoph Engel () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany)

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Abstract

Anti-trust cases more often than not hinge upon market definition. The anti-trust authorities use standardised tests for the purpose, like the "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" test prevalent in US law. These tests are often read as neoclassical economics, watered down to legal scale. They then are interpreted by economic concepts like cross price elasticities. These interpretations rest on methodological individualism. Social phenomena, like competition, are explained from the perspective of actors maximising their individual utility. If one wants to understand how an individual firm is controlled by competition, this is a most helpful approach. But for defining the effective area of competition, or the relevant market, methodological holism is more powerful. Its basic conceptual unit is not the individual, but communication. Markets are seen as implicitly or explicitly organised entities, giving an industry an identity, and helping the consumers orient themselves in a complex environment. Specifically, a market turns out to be a hybrid between co-operation (for constituting the area of competition) and conflict (within the area thus defined). This alternative approach is important for anti-trust practice. The decisive fact is not whether two products "objectively ought to be" substitutes. What market participants see as substitutes is the only thing that matters. Consequently, for market definition, anti-trust authorities may not (only) rely on their own wisdom. They must find ways to reconstruct the communication among market participants.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2003_11.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Publication status: published in: Andreas Fuchs/Hans-Peter Schwintowski/Daniel Zimmer (Eds.): Festschrift für Ulrich Immenga zum 70. Geburtstag, München 2004, 127-147.
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2003_11

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Related research
Keywords: Market Definition Constructivism

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B50 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - General
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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  2. McCloskey, Donald N, 1983. "The Rhetoric of Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 481-517, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," ARENA Working Papers p0180, ARENA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. U. Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary Economics," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2006-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
  6. Harless, David W & Camerer, Colin F, 1994. "The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility Theories," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1251-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Geroski, P. A., 1998. "Thinking creatively about markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 677-695, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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