In this paper, we study how competition on downstream gas markets is influenced by sourcing decisions in the supply chain. We analyze the sequential relationships between storage decisions and intermediate pricing in spot markets. We show that an upstream leadership in the access to storage facilities leads a dominant firm to adopt strategic storage decision. This strategy consists in stockpiling more than supplied in the downstream market. This behavior is a part of a raising rival's cost strategy for the leader. Furthermore in some cases, optimal regulation of gas storage access may not prevent such a behavior.
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Paper provided by LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 in its series Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) with number
2008.24.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2008.24
Contact details of provider: Postal: Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, LASER, Av. de la Mer - Espace Richter, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2, France Web page: http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr More information through EDIRC
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