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Monotonicity, Non-Participation, and Directed Search Equilibria

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  • James Bland, Simon Loertscher
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    Abstract

    We consider the canonical directed search framework in which sellers play pure strategies and assume that buyers play strategies that are monotone in prices, can remain inactive and choose to do so whenever their payoff from participating is zero regardless of what the other buyers do. We show that directed search equilibria, which have been the focus of the literature, are the only equilibria that satisfy these assumptions. Directed search equilibria are selected here not because buyers cannot coordinate – no such assumption is made – but because they fail to play strategies that require them to increase the demand for a seller’s good as this good becomes more expensive.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 1147.

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    Length: 19 pages
    Date of creation: 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1147

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    Keywords: Directed search; monotone strategies; directed search equilibrium.;

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    1. Menzio, Guido & Shi, Shouyong, 2010. "Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1453-1494, July.
    2. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2013. "Directed Search, Coordination Failure, And Seller Profits: An Experimental Comparison Of Posted Pricing With Single And Multiple Prices," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 873-884, 08.
    3. Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998. "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers dp98-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    4. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2012. "On The Game‐Theoretic Foundations Of Competitive Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 1-21, 02.
    5. William B. Hawkins, 2013. "Competitive Search, Efficiency, And Multiworker Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 219-251, 02.
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