Why Do African Banks Lend so Little?
Abstract
We put forward a plausible explanation of African financial under-development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Utilising an appropriately modified IO model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse selection (a lack of good projects). Applying a dynamic panel estimator to a large sample of African banks, we show that loan defaults are a major factor inhibiting bank lending when the quality of regulation is poor. We also find that once a threshold level of regulatory quality has been reached, improvements in the default rate or regulatory quality do not matter, providing support for our theoretical predictions.Download Info
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/19.Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2011
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:11/19
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Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
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Related research
Keywords: Dynamic panel data; African financial under-development; African credit markets;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2011-03-26 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-03-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DEV-2011-03-26 (Development)
- NEP-MFD-2011-03-26 (Microfinance)
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