Optimal Income Transfers and Tariffs
AbstractThis paper investigates the optimality of international income transfers in a two-country model in which each country engages in non-cooperative trade policy behaviour. It is shown that unconditional income transfers can never be optimal for the donor country, which not only suffers the loss of income but is harmed as the recipient responds optimally by raising tariffs. It is further shown that it is possible for the donor to attach carefully designed conditionality rules to the aid package to ensure that the recipient will agree to the package and that the donor's welfare is improved. In fact, the use of conditional income transfers is shown to result in a Pareto efficient equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 97-06.
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Other versions of this item:
- Kar-yiu Wong & Sajal LAHIRI & Pascalis RAIMONDOS-M & Alan D. WOODLAND, 1998. "Optimal Income Transfers and Tariffs," Working Papers 0076, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kar-yiu Wong & Sajal LAHIRI & Pascalis RAIMONDOS-M & Alan D. WOODLAND, 1998. "Optimal Income Transfers and Tariffs," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0076, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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- Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1997.
"Competition for aid and trade policy,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 369-385, November.
- Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos, . "Competition for Aid and Trade Policy," Economics Discussion Papers 433, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos, . "Competition for Aid and Trade Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series 94-12, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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