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The Welfare Effect of Quality Degradation in the Presence of Network Externalities

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Author Info
Jong-Hee Hahn () (Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele,)

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Abstract

This paper examines how the presence of network externalities affects a monopolist’s incentive for quality degradation and its welfare consequence. The software and the Internet service industries provide our primary motivation. The network externality may lead to a Pareto-improving quality degradation that would not be realised in the absence of network externalities. However, it may also overturn a potentially Paretoimproving quality degradation to a welfare-reducing one, or result in the realisation of a welfare-reducing quality degradation that would be avoided without network externalities. We also endogenise the firm’s forward and backward compatibility decisions between the original good and the degraded good. Key Words : Damaged Goods, Quality Degradation, Network Externalities, Compatibility,Price Discrimination, Software

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Keele University in its series Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) with number 2001/08.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision: Feb 2003
Publication status: Published in Information Economics and Policy, 2004, vol. 16, issue 4, pages 535-552. [ doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2003.07.002 ]
Handle: RePEc:kee:keeldp:2001/08

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/
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Postal: Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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  1. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Choi, Jay Pil, 1994. "Network Externality, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Obsolescence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 167-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bensaid, Bernard & Lesne, Jean-Philippe, 1996. "Dynamic monopoly pricing with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 837-855, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  6. repec:fth:coluec:564 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Waldman, Michael, 1993. "A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 273-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-40, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2000. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 253-272, Summer.
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  10. Cabral, Luis M. B. & Salant, David J. & Woroch, Glenn A., 1999. "Monopoly pricing with network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 199-214, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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