How norms can generate conflict
AbstractNorms play an important role in establishing social order. The current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general theory of "normative conflict" by differentiating between two different kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations of which means should be chosen to fulfil the norm, the second from distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in an experiment that applies the "strategy method" to the ultimatum game. Our data reveal normative conflict among different types of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and "cherry picker" types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-087.
Date of creation: 02 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Social norms; normative conflict; cooperation; ultimatum game; strategy method; equity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-11-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-11-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2009-11-14 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-11-14 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Luis Miller & Heiko Rauhut & Fabian Winter, 2011. "The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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