Fabian Winter () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena) Heiko Rauhut (ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) Dirk Helbing (ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
Abstract
Norms play an important role in establishing social order. The current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general theory of "normative conflict" by differentiating between two different kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations of which means should be chosen to fulfil the norm, the second from distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in an experiment that applies the "strategy method" to the ultimatum game. Our data reveal normative conflict among different types of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and "cherry picker" types.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
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