Effects of Profitable Downsizing on Collective Bargaining
AbstractWe experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesn't exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We ?nd that on the aggregate level the proposer's decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2008-011.
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2008
Date of revision:
bargaining; experiment; labor markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-02-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2008-02-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-02-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-02-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2008-02-16 (Labour Economics)
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