Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites
AbstractSuperfund cleanup has been extremely slow. Traditional analysis has centered around reducing negotiation and litigation to expedite the cleanup process. We investigate other factors which provide possible incentives for delay, namely, discounting, risk aversion, and compensation for off-site damage. We find that liability share plays an essential role in PRPs' incentives to delay. Commonly adopted EPA strategies, such as negotiating with PRP steering committees and buying outde minimisPRPs, may also lead to delay. The paper also designs a Bayesian mechanism for information extraction, and finds that the lump-sum transfer mechanism is not always efficient.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 1256.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, January 1998, vol. 35 no. 1, pp. 48-68
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 1998. "Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 48-68, January.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 1999.
"Cleanup delays at hazardous waste sites: an incomplete information game,"
Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley
qt2m01d1r0, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K. & Zhao, Jinhua, 1999. "Cleanup delays at hazardous waste sites: an incomplete information game," CUDARE Working Paper Series, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy 839, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stephanie Bridges) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Stephanie Bridges to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.