Shocks and Business Cycles
AbstractA popular theory of business cycles is that they are driven by animal spirits: shifts in expectations brought on by sunspots. A prominent example is Howitt and McAfee (AER, 1992). We show that this model has a unique equilibrium if there are payoff shocks of any size. This equilibrium still has the desirable property that recessions and expansions can occur without any large exogenous shocks. We give an algorithm for computing the equilibrium and study its comparative statics properties. This work generalizes Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2000) to the case of endogenous frictions and seasonal and mean-reverting shocks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12274.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics 2005, vol. 5 no. 1
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Other versions of this item:JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2005-04-16 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2005-04-16 (Macroeconomics)
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