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Democrazia di Bilancio e Governo delle Finanze pubbliche nella storia del Budgeting pubblico

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  • Antonio Di Majo

    (Università Roma Tre)

Abstract

Il saggio ripercorre i caratteri salienti della storia delle Finanze Pubbliche del mondo occidentale con particolare riguardo al processo di formazione, stesura e approvazione dei Bilanci Pubblici al fine di spiegare l’evoluzione generale del “Budgeting pubblico” (nei suoi aspetti procedurali e sostanziali). La trattazione diacronica si incentrerà sulla complessa interazione tra situazione economica, scelte di politica di bilancio e sintesi degli interessi provenienti dalla società civile, utilizzando opportune chiavi di lettura a seconda delle diverse priorità attribuite al bilancio nel corso del tempo. Il saggio si conclude con una riflessione sulla recente importanza della Fiscal Consolidation e sul relativo significato in termini di politiche macroeconomiche di bilancio.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Di Majo, 2020. "Democrazia di Bilancio e Governo delle Finanze pubbliche nella storia del Budgeting pubblico," Working papers 86, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipu:wpaper:86
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Istituzioni di bilancio; Politiche di bilancio; democrazia di bilancio;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

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