AbstractAn extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions which can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p > 1/2. Condorcet's Jury Theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp362.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Econometrica, 2004, vol. 72, pp. 1565-1581.
social choice; information aggregation; Arrow's theorem; simple games; the Shapley-Shubik power index; threshold phenomena;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-06-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2004-06-07 (Discrete Choice Models)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Olle Haggstrom & Gil Kalai & Elchanan Mossel, 2004. "A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority," Discussion Paper Series dp363, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Beigman, Eyal, 2010. "Simple games with many effective voters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 15-22, January.
- Joe Neeman, 2014. "A law of large numbers for weighted plurality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 99-109, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilan Nehama).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.