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Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams

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Author Info
Kamaga, Kohei
Kojima, Takashi

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Abstract

This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining Q-Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou-Dalton Equity.

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File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/15921/1/pie_dp391.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series PIE/CIS Discussion Paper with number 391.

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Length: 12 p.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:391

Note: First version, September 10, 2007; Current version, August 8, 2008
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Web page: http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Q-Anonymity; Intergenerational equity; Generalized Lorenz criterion; Leximin principle; Utilitarianism; Simplified criterion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Geir B, ASHEIM & Claude, DÕASPREMONT & Kuntal, BANERJEE, 2008. "Generalized time-invariant overtaking," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2008044, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Geir B. Asheim & Kuntal Banerjee, 2009. "Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up," Working Papers 09001, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University. [Downloadable!]
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