Jonsson, Thomas () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
Abstract
This paper attempts to explain Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the in.uence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership (so called Euro-groups). The analysis is based on panel-data for .fteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, e¤ective lobbying presents a collective action problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support, suggesting that farmer Euro-groups in.uence agricultural policy within the EU.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number
713.
Length: 20 pages Date of creation: 07 Jun 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0713
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Phone: 090 - 786 61 42 Fax: 090 - 77 23 02 Email: Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/ More information through EDIRC
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