Effects of Redistribution Policies - Who Gains and Who Loses?
AbstractThe paper combines optimal taxation theory with human capital theory and develops a theoretical model with endogenous wages and education decision, in which redistributive policy experiments are carried out and assessed. It is argued that general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation on wages may counteract fiscal redistribution. It is also shown that education subsidies may only benefit skilled workers, suggesting that this subsidy can merely be viewed as a redistribution from unskilled to skilled individuals. Therefore, optimal policy involves a lump-sum education tax in the form of a negative education subsidy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2007:12.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
Income Redistribution; Education Subsidies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2007-06-30 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-EDU-2007-06-30 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2007-06-30 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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