von Greiff, Camilo () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
Abstract
The paper combines optimal taxation theory with human capital theory and develops a theoretical model with endogenous wages and education decision, in which redistributive policy experiments are carried out and assessed. It is argued that general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation on wages may counteract fiscal redistribution. It is also shown that education subsidies may only benefit skilled workers, suggesting that this subsidy can merely be viewed as a redistribution from unskilled to skilled individuals. Therefore, optimal policy involves a lump-sum education tax in the form of a negative education subsidy.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number
2007:12.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 27 Jun 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2007_0012
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden Phone: +46 8 16 20 00 Fax: +46 8 16 14 25 Email: Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Philip Trostel & Ian Walker, 2006.
"Education and Work,"
Education Economics,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 377-399, December.
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