Why Are Capital Income Taxes So High?
AbstractThe Ramsey optimal taxation theory implies that the tax rate on capital income should be zero in the long run. This result holds even if the social planner only cares about workers that do not hold assets, or if the planner only cares about any other group in the economy. This paper demonstrates that although all households agree that capital income taxation should be eliminated in the long run, they do not agree on how to eliminate these taxes. Wealthy households would prefer a reform that is funded mostly by higher taxes on labor income while households with little wealth would prefer a reform that is funded mostly by high taxes on initial wealth. Pareto improving reforms typically exist, but the welfare gains of such reforms are modest.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 623.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 08 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
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optimal taxation; inequality; redistribution;
Other versions of this item:
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2006-03-25 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MAC-2006-03-25 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-03-25 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-03-25 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-03-25 (Public Finance)
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- François Gourio, 2008.
"Is there a majority to support a capital tax cut?,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
wp2008-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Albert Marcet & Katharina Greulich, 2008.
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UFAE and IAE Working Papers
733.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Mathieu-Bolh, Nathalie, 2010. "Welfare improving distributionally neutral tax reforms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1253-1268, September.
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