The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.
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Length: 31 pages Date of creation: Mar 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Public Choice, 1996, pages 339-361 Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0108
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General