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Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives

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Author Info
Rose, Caspar (Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School)
Abstract

The article studies how takeover defenses influence managerial

incentives with respect to long term investments, excess liquidity and the amount of

debt relative to equity. The article conducts a cross-sectional regression based on a

sample of Danish listed firms, dealing explicitly with the problem of causation

between the variables. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist

of shares with dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation

ownership. The article finds that protected firms have significantly less debt to

equity. However, protected firms are not significantly more oriented towards the

long-term and do not have significantly more excess liquidity.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7172
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance in its series Working Papers with number 2002-5.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2002_005

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: +45 3815 3815
Email:
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/finance/
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Related research
Keywords: Takeover Defenses; Company Law; Corporate Control; Corporate Governance; Simultaneous Equation Estimation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Corporation and Securities Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Szewczyk, Samuel H. & Tsetsekos, George P., 1992. "State intervention in the market for corporate control : The case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 3-23. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 2347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Steen Thomsen, 1999. "Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 117-137, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roll, Richard, 1977. "A critique of the asset pricing theory's tests Part I: On past and potential testability of the theory," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 129-176, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Neumann, Robert & Voetmann, Torben, 1999. "Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from Changes in Institutional and Strategic Investors' Equity Holdings," Working Papers 1999-9, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance. [Downloadable!]
  10. Langetieg, Terence C., 1978. "An application of a three-factor performance index to measure stockholder gains from merger," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 365-383, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1986. "Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 293-309, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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