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The Direction of Causality Between Blockholder Ownership and Firm Value: US and EU Evidence

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Author Info
Pedersen, Torben (Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School)
Thomsen, Steen (Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School)
Kvist, Hans Kurt (The Statistics Group, Copenhagen Business School)
Abstract

We examine the causal relationship between blockholder ownership (measured by the fraction of shares controlled by large shareholders) and firm value (measured as the simple Tobin's Q) of the largest EU and US companies. Using Granger causality tests we find no significant causal effects either way in the US/UK, but in continental Europe we find a negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm value and a negative effect of firm value on blockholder ownership. Consistent with an overall non-linear relationship, as hypothesised by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Stultz (1988), the negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm value performance is found to be significant only for companies with high initial levels of blockholder ownership (> 10%), but insignificant for companies with low initial levels. Consistent with lower protection of minority investors and larger private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) the causal relationships are only significant in continental Europe, even for high initial levels of blockholder ownership.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/handle/10398/6523
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and Management in its series Working Papers with number 16-2001.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jun 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhb:cbsint:2001-016

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Postal: Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Howitzvej 60, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: +45 3815 2515
Fax: +45 3815 2500
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/int/
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Related research
Keywords: Blockholder ownership; Firm value; Europe; Firm objectives;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Torben Pedersen, Steen Thomsen, 1999. "Economic and Systemic Explanations of Ownership Concentration among Europe's Largest Companies," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 367-381, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomsen, Steen & Pedersen, Torben, 1998. "Industry and ownership structure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 385-402, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Cubbin, John S & Leech, Dennis, 1983. "The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(37), pages 351-69, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Granger, C W J, 1969. "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 424-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  8. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dilip K. Shome & Sudhir Singh, 1995. "Firm Value and External Blockholdings," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(4), Winter.
  10. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994. "A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), Fall.
  13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," NBER Working Papers 7403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Bergstrom, Clas & Rydqvist, Kristian, 1990. "The determinants of corporate ownership : An empirical study on Swedish data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 237-253, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Morck, Randall & Nakamura, Masao & Shivdasani, Anil, 2000. "Banks, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value in Japan," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 539-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Charles P. Himmelberg & R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 2000. "Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance," NBER Working Papers 7209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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