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Mutual Insurance With Asymmetric Information: The Case Of Adverse Selection

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  • Renaud Bourlès

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Dominique Henriet

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information on mutual risk-sharing agreements. It displays the optimal incentive compatible sharing rule in a simple two-agent model with two levels of risk. When individual risk is public information, equal sharing of wealth is not achievable when risk heterogeneity is too large or when risk aversion is too low. However the mutualization principle still holds as agents only bear aggregate risk. This result no longer holds when risk is private information. Moreover, the asymmetry of information (i) makes equal sharing unsustainable when both individuals are low risk types (ii) induces some exchanges when agents have the same level of initial wealth and (iii) induces changes in the direction of transfer with respect to the complete information benchmark in some states of nature when risk types are independent and absolute risk aversion is decreasing and convex.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00278178.

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Date of creation: 09 May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00278178

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Related research

Keywords: Mutual agreements; Asymmetric information; Mechanism Design;

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  1. Ligon, Ethan & Thomas, Jonathan P & Worrall, Tim, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 209-44, January.
  2. Dubois, Pierre & Jullien, Bruno & Magnac, Thierry, 2005. "Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 351, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Dec 2007.
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  11. James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, 2005. "The Formation of Mutual Insurers in Markets with Adverse Selection," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 529-556, March.
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  14. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  15. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
  16. Renaud Bourl�s & Dominique Henriet, 2012. "Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(1), pages 27-56, March.
  17. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Renaud Bourlès & Juliette Rouchier, 2012. "Evolving Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives and Other-Regarding Preferences," Working Papers halshs-00793706, HAL.
  2. Renaud Bourl�s & Dominique Henriet, 2012. "Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(1), pages 27-56, March.
  3. Mohamed Belhaj & Renaud Bourl?s & Fr?d?ric Dero?an, 2014. "Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 58-90, February.

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