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Political Economy of growth and poverty in Burkina Faso: Power, Institutions and Rents

Author

Listed:
  • Estelle Koussoubé

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Augustin Loada

    (UJZK - Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo [Ouagadougou])

  • Gustave Nebié

    (UNICEF - WHO)

  • Marc Raffinot

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to assess the relevance of the use of the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework to explain the performances of Burkina Faso in terms of economic growth and development. The political history of Burkina Faso has been very unstable until president Campaoré took power in 1987. Since then, the stability has been based on low intensity violence, with bursts of open violence like those of the mutinies of 2011. This "stability" is based on the balance of power between two main "elite" groups, the army and the traditional chiefs. Trade unions, the Catholic Church and Donors also play a role, especially in case of trouble. The political class in power and its cronies are extracting rents by creating de facto monopolies, which enables them to tame violence, to a certain extent. The paradox is that the Burkinabe economy is growing steadily (GDP per capital grew at an average 1.5 per cent rate since independence), rather smoothly in the medium run – one of the best records in West-Africa. Because of high inequality, this impressive growth is far from inclusive.

Suggested Citation

  • Estelle Koussoubé & Augustin Loada & Gustave Nebié & Marc Raffinot, 2017. "Political Economy of growth and poverty in Burkina Faso: Power, Institutions and Rents," Working Papers hal-01489499, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01489499
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mireille Razafindrakoto & François Roubaud & Jean-Michel Wachsberger, 2013. "Institutions, gouvernance et croissance de long terme à Madagascar : l'enigme et le paradoxe," Working Papers DT/2013/13, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Croissance à long terme; Economie politique; Institutions; Ordre social à accès limité; Burkina Faso; Limited Access Order; Long term growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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