Should we Worry About the Fiscal Numerology of Maastricht?
AbstractThe paper reviews and evaluates in a non-technical manner the economic and political arguments for and against the two fiscal convergence criteria written into the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocols. In order to qualify for full membership in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), net general government borrowing may not exceed 3% of GDP and general government gross debt may not exceed 60% of GDP. The paper concludes that the adoption of these two universal fiscal reference values is arbitrary, without theoretical or practical foundation. It reflects the triumph of central bank (especially Bundesbank) fiscal-political dogma over economic reasoning and common sense. Attempts to meet these fiscal norms would result in unnecessary hardship for a number of countries and a deflationary fiscal stance for the EC as a whole.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale - Economic Growth Center in its series Papers with number 654.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
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Postal: U.S.A.; YALE UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE STATION NEW-HAVEN CONNECTICUT 06520 U.S.A
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Web page: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/
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economic integration ; monetary policy ; government ; banks;
Other versions of this item:
- Buiter, Willem H, 1992. "Should We Worry About the Fiscal Numerology of Maastricht?," CEPR Discussion Papers 668, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- H - Public Economics
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- Koren, Stephan & Stiassny, Alfred, 1998. "Tax and Spend, or Spend and Tax? An International Study," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 163-191, April.
- R. Sean Craig, 1994. "Who will join EMU? Impact of the Maastricht convergence criteria on economic policy choice and performance," International Finance Discussion Papers 480, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Neményi, Judit & Halpern, László, 2000.
"A konvergencia fiskális feltételei és az Európai Unióhoz való csatlakozás
[The fiscal conditions for convergence and accession to the European Union]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 116-135.
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