In this paper, we study the effects of consumer information on equilibrium market prices and observable product quality in the market for child care. Child care markets offer a unique opportunity to study these effects because of the existence of resource and referral agencies (R&Rs) in some markets. R&Rs provide consumers with information on availiability, price, and observable characteristics of care. To understand the effects of information provision in markets like child care, which exhibit a distribution of product quality, we examine the effects of information provision in a model of vertical differentiation.
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Paper provided by Wellesley College - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
98-02.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
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