An Equilibrium for Games Played by Imperfect Organizations
AbstractThis paper argues that when organizations are imperfect in the sense that members may make mistakes and messages may be distorted, then the inner structure of the organization should be explicitly modeled. This paper proposes a framework for studying games between imperfect organizations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2001-12.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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DECENTRALIZATION ; GAMES ; DECISION MAKING;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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- Eliaz, K., 2001.
"Nash Equilibrium When Players Account for the Complexity of their Forecasts,"
2001-6, Tel Aviv.
- Eliaz, Kfir, 2003. "Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 286-310, August.
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