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Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts

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Eliaz, Kfir

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 44 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 286-310
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:286-310

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  1. Friederike Mengel, 2007. "Learning Across Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Ran Spiegler, 2003. "Simplicity of Beliefs and Delay Tactics in a Concession Game," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000208, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ran Spiegler, 2001. "Testing Threats in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 0009, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000106, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
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