A Model of Countertrade
AbstractCountertrade - or reciprocal buying - is defined as a transaction involving (at least) a two-way transfer of goods, rather than a singular transfer of goods for money. The main objective of this paper is to explain the extensive use of countertrade both between countries and between firms within one country. In a simple game-theoretic model it is shown that countertrade may be a rational business strategy for firms with buying power, and that the impact on welfare is negative, even in the case where no firm exists. The model is consistent with the observations that countertrade occurs mainly in homogeneous goods industries, that trades are relatively balanced and that the practice is more widespread during recessions than during booms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 14-90.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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goods ; enterprises ; game theory ; welfare economics;
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- John Sutton, 2001. "Rich Trades, Scarce Capabilities: Industrial Development Revisited," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 28, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Stole, Lars A., 1996. "Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 67-84, February.
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