This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of their network. The estimation then measures the branching costs and a upper bound for the entry costs. It also asseses how these costs evolve over time and to what extent they are influenced by various European directives, aiming at deregulating the banking industry.
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Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number
97.473.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other
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