Egalitarianism and Incentives
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University, Institute for Economic Development in its series Boston University - Institute for Economic Development with number 73.
Date of creation: Mar 1996
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- Corchón, Luis C. & Dahm, Matthias, 2010.
"Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit,"
2072/148481, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Corchón, Luis & Dahm, Matthias, 2011. "Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 309-317.
- Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2009. "Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit," Economics Working Papers we097343, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Corchon, Luis, 2009. "Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit," MPRA Paper 18761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Debraj Ray & Jean-Marie Baland & Olivier Dagnelie, 2007.
"Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 922-935, 07.
- Luis C. Corchón & Lourdes Moreno, 2010.
"Interpreting markups in Spanish manufacturing: the exponential model,"
Economics Working Papers
we1030, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Moreno, L., 2010. "Interpreting markups in Spanish manufacturing: The exponential model," MPRA Paper 26609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Neslihan Uler, 2011. "Public goods provision, inequality and taxes," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 287-306, September.
- Chakravorty, Bhaskar & Corchon, Luis C. & Wilkie, Simon, 2006.
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Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 18-36, October.
- Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993. "Credible Implementation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Chakravorti, B. & Corchon, L.C., 1992. "Credible Implementation," Papers 76, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
- Gaspart, Frederic & Seki, Erika, 2003. "Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 51-77, May.
- Uler, Neslihan, 2009. "Public goods provision and redistributive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 440-453, April.
- Anderson, Siwan & Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove, 2009. "Enforcement in informal saving groups," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 14-23, September.
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