This paper investigates if, and how, aternative bargaining agentas may sustain (or, emerge) endogenously, under conditions of centralized wage bargaining, in industries with market power. The wage & employment bargains agenta ("Efficient Bargains") is shown to be a strategic device to induce (weak) wage-compliance, used by large, technologically efficient firms; whenever there are incentives for wage-undercutting, on the part of small, labour-intensive firms.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies in its series Athens University of Economics and Business with number
107.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:athebu:107
Contact details of provider: Postal: Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies. Parission 76, Athens Greece 10434 Phone: +30 1 8203250 Fax: +301 8228419 Web page: http://www.aueb.gr/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).