The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited

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The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited

Author Info

Slade, M. E.

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Margaret Emily Slade

Abstract

I assess the private profitability of tying under circumstances where the standard efficiency defenses do not necessarily hold and demonstrate that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances. I also examine data from the Canadian newspaper-advertising industry and argue that price discrimination, cost saving, and quality control are unlikely motives for tying in this market. Nevertheless, with newspapers, tying and monopoly power go hand in hand.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 97b02.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97b02

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Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Slade, M.E., 1997. "The leverage Theory of Tying Revisited," UBC Departmental Archives 97-9, UBC Department of Economics.
- Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited," Old UBC Departmental Papers 9709, UBC Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Portfolio Effects and Merger Control: Full-line Forcing as an Entry Deterrence Strategy," Industrial Organization 0301010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Stephen Martin, 1998. "Strategic and Welfare Implications of Bundling," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Martin, Stephen, 1999. "Strategic and welfare implications of bundling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 371-376, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thibaud Verge, 2002. "Portfolio Analysis in European Merger Control: An Economic Analysis," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/046, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
Thibaud Vergé, 2001. "Multiproduct Monopolist and Full-line Forcing: The Efficiency Argument Revisited," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12, pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]

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