The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited
Abstract
I assess the private profitability of tying under circumstances where the standard efficiency defenses do not necessarily hold and demonstrate that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances. I also examine data from the Canadian newspaper-advertising industry and argue that price discrimination, cost saving, and quality control are unlikely motives for tying in this market. Nevertheless, with newspapers, tying and monopoly power go hand in hand.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 97b02.Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97b02
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Related research
Keywords: ANTITRUST LEGISLATION ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; MANUFACTURING;Other versions of this item:
- Slade, M.E., 1997. "The leverage Theory of Tying Revisited," UBC Departmental Archives 97-9, UBC Department of Economics.
- Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited," Old UBC Departmental Papers 9709, UBC Department of Economics.
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Thibaud Verge, 2002. "Portfolio Analysis in European Merger Control: An Economic Analysis," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/046, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Portfolio Effects and Merger Control: Full-line Forcing as an Entry Deterrence Strategy," Industrial Organization 0301010, EconWPA.
- Thibaud Vergé, 2001. "Multiproduct Monopolist and Full-line Forcing: The Efficiency Argument Revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(4), pages 1-9.
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