Take the Money and Run: Making Profi ts by Paying Borrowers to Stay Home
AbstractCan a bank increase its profi t by subsidizing inactivity? This paper suggests this may occur, due to the presence of hidden information, in a monopolistic credit market. Rather than offering credit in a pooling contract, a monopolist bank can sort borrowers through an appropriate subsidy to inactivity. Under some conditions, sorting may avoid the collapse of the market and increases the welfare of everybody. The bank increases its profi ts, good borrowers bene fit from lower interest rates and bad potential borrowers from the subsidy. The subsidy policy however implies a cross subsidy between contracts and this is possible only under monopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Economics with number wp2012_27.rdf.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Credit market; Screening; Subsidy;
Other versions of this item:
- G. Coco & D. De Meza & G. Pignataro & F. Reito, 2013. "Take the money and run: making profits by paying borrowers to stay home," Working Papers wp861, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-01-07 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2013-01-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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