Gender, caste, and public goods provision in Indian village governments:
Abstract"This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on village governance and local public goods provision. Using data from 144 village-level governments in India's Tamil Nadu state, we examine whether the gender and caste of village government leaders influence village public goods provision. In particular, we examine: 1) whether public goods are provided in accordance with gender or caste preferences; and 2) whether public goods provision differs based on the knowledge level of the village government leader. We find evidence of different preferences for public goods between men and women, and between Scheduled Caste (SC) and non-SC persons. Additionally, a test of knowledge regarding the village government reveals that female and SC presidents receive lower scores relative to male and non-SC presidents, with women scoring lowest overall. We find that preferences and knowledge have little effect on public goods provision by female presidents, and hypothesize that this may be due to the influence of their male spouses. In the context of SC presidents, we find evidence that SC presidents provide more drinking water access—a location-specific public good—to SC-inhabited village areas." from authors' abstract
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in its series IFPRI discussion papers with number 807.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Local governance; public goods provision; Gender; Caste;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2008-11-04 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2008-11-04 (Development)
- NEP-PBE-2008-11-04 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-11-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2008-11-04 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nagarajan, Hari K. & Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2011. "Can political reservations affect political equilibria in the long-term? Evidence from local elections in rural India," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 59, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Mu, Ren & Zhang, Xiaobo, 2011. "The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China," IFPRI discussion papers 1061, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2011.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy,"
18-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2012. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy," Working Papers 07-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Nagarajan, Hari K. & Fang, Xia, 2011. "Does female reservation affect long-term political outcomes ? Evidence from rural India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5708, The World Bank.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.