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Do “Too-Big-To-Fail” Banks Take On More Risk?

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Abstract

In the previous post, Joo Santos showed that the largest banks benefit from a bigger discount in the bond market relative to the largest nonbank financial and nonfinancial issuers. Today?s post approaches a complementary Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) question?do banks take on more risk if they?re likely to receive government support? Historically, commentators have expressed concerns that TBTF status encourages banks to engage in risky behavior. However, empirical evidence to substantiate these concerns thus far has been sparse. Using new ratings from Fitch, we tackle this question by examining how changes in the perceived likelihood of government support affect bank lending policies.

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  • Gara M. Afonso & João A. C. Santos & James Traina, 2014. "Do “Too-Big-To-Fail” Banks Take On More Risk?," Liberty Street Economics 201404326a, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednls:86945
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    Cited by:

    1. Ongena, Steven & Savaşer, Tanseli & Şişli Ciamarra, Elif, 2022. "CEO incentives and bank risk over the business cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    2. Aikman, David & Haldane, Andrew & Hinterschweiger, Marc & Kapadia, Sujit, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    3. Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, 2021. "The Impact of Fintech Startups on Financial Institutions' Performance and Default Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 9050, CESifo.
    4. Fonseka, Mohan & Richardson, Grant & Shekhar, Chander & Yang, Xing, 2023. "The impact of social trust on loan grants and default risk: Evidence from China’s regional commercial banks during branching policy changes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    5. Simon Firestone & Amy Lorenc & Ben Ranish, 2017. "An Empirical Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital in the US," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-034, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Cummings, James R. & Guo, Yilian, 2020. "Do the Basel III capital reforms reduce the implicit subsidy of systemically important banks? Australian evidence," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    7. Leanza, Luca & Sbuelz, Alessandro & Tarelli, Andrea, 2021. "Bail-in vs bail-out: Bank resolution and liability structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Levent Altinoglu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2023. "Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 35-64, April.
    9. Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano, 2016. "Bank bias in Europe: effects on systemic risk and growth," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 31(85), pages 51-106.
    10. Beladi, Hamid & Hu, May & Park, Jason & How, Janice, 2020. "Liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    11. Simona Malovana & Dominika Kolcunova & Vaclav Broz, 2017. "Does Monetary Policy Influence Banks' Perception of Risks?," Working Papers 2017/9, Czech National Bank.
    12. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    13. Azadeh Zohrehvand & Saifuzzaman Ibrahim & Muzafar Shah Habibullah & Zulkornain Yusop & Nik Ahmad Sufian Burhan, 2020. "Influence of Governance on the Relationship Between Foreign Banks’ Penetration and Banking Stability," Asian Journal of Empirical Research, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 10(11), pages 231-238, November.
    14. Behr, Patrick & Wang, Weichao, 2020. "The (un)intended effects of government bailouts: The impact of TARP on the interbank market and bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    risk taking; Too-Big-To-Fail; Government support;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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